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PLANS, TAKES, AND MIS-TAKES 
This paper analyzes what may have been a mistake by pianist Thelonious Monk playing a jazz solo in 1958. Even in 
a Monk composition designed for patterned mayhem, a note can sound out of pattern. We reframe the question of 
whether the note was a mistake and ask instead about how Monk handles the problem. Amazingly, he replays the 
note into a new pattern that resituates its jarring effect in retrospect. The mistake, or better, the mis-take, was “saved” 
by subsequent notes. Our analysis, supported by relections from jazz musicians and the philosopher John Dewey, 
encourages a reformulation of plans, takes, mis-takes as categories for the interpretation of contingency, surprise, and 
repair in all human activities. A inal section suggests that mistakes are essential to the practical plying and playing 
of knowledge into performances, particularly those that highlight learning.
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A mistake is the most beautiful thing in the 
world. It is the only way you can get to some 
place you've never been before. I try to make 
as many as I can. Making a mistake is the only 
way that you can grow. 
Drummer E. W. Wainwright (conversation with 
Klemp, 2001)
Conceptions and systems of conceptions, ends 
in view and plans, are constantly making and 
remaking as fast as those already in use reveal 
their weaknesses, defects and positive values. 
Philosopher John Dewey (1929/1984, pp. 133-
134)
… overzeal to select materials and appliances 
which forbid a chance for mistakes to occur, 
restricts initiative, reduces judgment to a mini-
mum, and compels the use of methods which 
are so remote from the complex situations of 
life that the power gained is of little availability. 
John Dewey (1916a, p. 198)
There are no mistakes on the bandstand. 
Vibraphonist Stefon Harris (2011)
This paper1 analyzes a difficult moment in a 
jazz solo performance by pianist Thelonious Monk 
(b. 1917, d. 1982) on a recording of “In Walked 
Bud,” from the album, Misterioso (1958). Our 
descriptive goal is to situate Monk's performance 
in relation to two kinds of data: most importantly, 
sequential data from notes played before and after 
the difficult moment; and secondly, comparative 
data from the same solo played on two other occa-
sions, one in 1957, the other in 1959, both in remar-
kably similar, but not identical ways, but neither of 
them showing any signs of the struggle that marked 
the 1958 recording.
Artistic work is demanding because it lives off 
– it requires – dificult moments that performers can 
use, as John Dewey said, to throw back “the covers 
that hide the expressiveness of experienced things” 
and to build “relationships that sum up and carry 
forward” (1934/1980, pp. 166, 104). In his artistic 
work on a piano keyboard, Monk had to coordinate 
past and future in a continually evolving activity 
sequence rapidly executed in real time. Notes upon 
notes had to be made somehow to “sum up and carry 
forward.”2
There are two reasons for borrowing Dewey's 
theoretical language to articulate Monk's situation 
and achievement. From Dewey's earliest work on 
perception (1896/1981) and even logic (1893), he 
always insisted that activities are organized in time, 
at a particular time, often at just the right time, and 
always with a simultaneous concern for both the 
future and the past. The opening line of his mid-
career essays on logic reported that the “key” to his 
work “lies in the passages regarding the temporal 
development of experience” (1916b, p. 1), and his 
late-in-life volumes address topics – art, education, 
ethics, and logic, topics all too easy to treat stati-
cally – as on-going temporal achievements. Change 
and uncertainty are the only constants in Dewey's 
thought, and he identiies movement, direction, and 
rhythm as essential resources for anyone iguring out 
what to do next. To those who listen carefully, jazz 
musicians (along with, from a long list, poets, come-
dians, spies, and con artists) exemplify this view of 
life perhaps most miraculously. Real time inhabits 
the iterative, relexive, and reticular work of sequen-
cing activities with activities. It is distinct from linear 
clock-time that passes by one pre-set unit at a time. 
In real time, a moment is, well, momentary, lee-
ting and without character, and it takes its identity 
in a sequence of moments of which it is not just a 
part, but a constitutive part. Activities help build 
their own environments, albeit under conditions 
well structured in advance; by their very occurrence, 
they relexively constitute the conditions of their 
own signiicance. Moments, like notes played on a 
keyboard, become consequential – even momen-
tous – by their simultaneous connections to things 
that have already happened and are about to happen.
Dewey's is not the only twentieth century cele-
bration of the relentless temporality of human 
activities,3 but its elegance is getting now apprecia-
ted (Sleeper, 1986; Hickman, 1992; Burke, 1994; 
Manicas, 1998/2008). John McDermott says that 
Dewey offers “a metaphysics of transiency, in which 
human life is seen as a wandering, a traveling, a 
bemusement which rocks side to side, comedy and 
tragedy, breakthrough and setback – yet, in all, a 
purposive, even progressive, trip” (2007, p. 157). 
The “transiency” is most apparent in actual perfor-
mances, in people rocking “side to side,” and this 
paper uses Monk's “purposive, even progressive” 
solo as such an opportunity.4
A second reason for using Dewey is that his ideas 
on thinking, doing, and performing in real time are 
at the heart of his theories of inquiry, knowledge, 
learning, and education. If Monk's solo is a site for 
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the exploration of temporality in the organization 
of behavior, it can be used to rethink learning and 
education as well. Given his prominent place in 
educational theory, it is surprising that Dewey thinks 
of learning as secondary to the rest of what people 
do, as less a thing in itself than a sidebar to other 
and likely more important activities. Across his work, 
Dewey relentlessly wrote of learning as a progres-
sive activity among activities rather than as a stock-
pile, the latter being what he called “mere learning”: 
useful for taking tests in school perhaps, but rarely 
helpful in pressing situations requiring growth. For 
Dewey, learning is “a necessary accompaniment” to 
getting something done, something other than lear-
ning for its own sake. In a late statement, he calls 
learning “a product,” but only to emphasize that it 
is secondary: 
“Learning is the product of the exercise of powers 
needed to meet the demands of the activity in 
operation… [a performer's] primary aim is to do his 
work better, but learning is a necessary accompaniment, 
the more so as being largely the unconscious effect of 
other acts and experiences.” (1937, p. 238)
Even when conceived of as a product, learning, 
for Dewey, is secondary to getting on in life. It is not 
so much a product as a by-product, a product bye 
and bye, of more pressing engagements. 
The bulk of this paper describes Monk organizing 
his behavior in real time, and at the end we speculate 
briely on the implications of Monk's performance for 
Dewey's attention to, irst, sequential organization 
and, second, learning and education. We proceed in 
three sections: we derive categories for understan-
ding Monk's performance, then we use them in the 
description, and inally we focus on the importance 
of time in theorizing activities, particularly learning.
TERMS, OFF AND ON KEY
I made the wrong mistakes. 
Thelonious Monk, after a disappointing perfor-
mance [https://www.wikiquote.org/]5
There were no wrong notes on his pi- 
a-no had no wrong notes, oh no… 
He played not one wrong note, not one. 
His pi-a-no had none, not one. 
Chris Raschka, on Monk (1997, pp. 6-9, 14-17; 
recited to the tune, Misterioso)
Notes that sound out of place are a constant threat 
to performance. Coordination can break down, and 
wrong notes can halt a performance (particularly in 
rehearsal sessions). Monk's solo builds to a threa-
tening moment, and a note gets played seemingly 
out of sequence. What Dewey calls its “whence and 
how” – as in “whence and how the quality proceeds” 
(1934/1980, p. 138) – gets disrupted and threatens 
the discernable order.6 Any note might be a mistake 
or not depending on context, the rules of harmony, 
the player's inattention or the audience's expecta-
tions. If not a wrong note played by mistake, it could 
have been a wrong note played intentionally, or a 
right note in a coherent scheme Monk had yet to 
display or even to discover. Whatever it was – never 
to be known for sure – Monk reshapes it into an 
opportunity for a new sense of “whence and how.” 
Whatever it might have been, it becomes, for a period 
of time immediately following its occurrence, a chal-
lenge for Monk and his listeners.
Before describing Monk's mis-take, we reframe 
the terms in our title to it the demands of analy-
zing improvisation. If a song has a plan, a particu-
lar performance constitutes a take, and any take is 
ripe for a mis-take. The more we listened to Monk, 
the more our analytic focus shifted from presumed 
plan to actual take. At irst, we heard the music as 
a mere mock-up of what Monk had in mind; the 
plan seemed more real than the take, performance 
a pale copy of competence. “When arts follow ixed 
models,” complained Dewey, “and when the element 
of individual invention in design is condemned as 
caprice, forms and ends are necessarily external to 
the individual worker” (1929/1958, p. 92). When 
forms and ends, says Dewey, precede “any particular 
realization,” the worker, the artist, the person and 
their activities are analytically pushed aside, and the 
world in which events happen becomes invisible. 
The actor is cut off: lost in thought, lost in ought. 
The more we listened to Monk, the more the world 
of his music reemerged. The music became analy-
tically more central than our version of his plans. 
We were experiencing in our analysis what Chuck 
Israels says he experiences in playing jazz: “No 
matter what you’re doing or thinking about before-
hand, from the very moment the performance begins, 
you plunge into that world of sounds. It becomes 
your world instantly, and your whole consciousness 
changes” (quoted in Berliner, 1994, p. 348). Fingers 
and notes became the story. They had their own 
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biography. Monk produced the notes, but he was 
their servant as well, for once played, he had to bow 
to their consequences. Monk both created and unde-
rwent their demands, and they told their own story.7 
Analytically, plans and their mistakes grew small, 
and takes and mis-takes more prominent. Our analy-
sis was overtaken by a web of connections Monk 
created, summed up, and carried forward.
From here forward, we use the term mistake 
to refer to what might be heard as a wrong note; 
because we are unsure it is a mistake, or unsure 
of the grounds for calling it a mistake, we usually 
modify it as “apparent” or “seeming.”8 When we 
refer to an apparent deviation from patterns esta-
blished by previous notes and used in turn, and in 
time – just in time – to build a new pattern, we write 
the word in italics with a hyphen: mis-take. The diffe-
rence between a mistake and a mis-take is never clear 
when a jarring note occurs, but it can become clear 
upon analysis in the same way it becomes clear to 
a performer: with effort, over time, in the course of 
renovation, with relation to what came before and 
after, with relation to “whence and how.” In the 
descriptive section, most every use of the term mis-
take represents as much an accomplishment for the 
analyst as it once was for the performer. We are not 
defending bad performances. Rather we are noticing 
that good and bad are dificult terms to use without 
a speciication of the context and purpose at hand.
By commonsense, a mistake is easy to understand; 
a clinker, like a missed line in a recitation, interferes 
with how a performance sounds and contrasts with a 
less strident note that did not occur, but should have 
in a more carefully planned or better played perfor-
mance. What originally made Monk's performance 
interesting was an apparent mistake. Despite the 
dissonance and occasional melodic chaos of a typical 
Monk composition, there is great discipline, and a 
note can sound out of pattern. In the 1958 solo, the 
sequence of “whence and how,” both structure and 
its promise, were disrupted.
Was the mistake one of plans or hands? We 
cannot answer the question, although we have tried. 
A better question to ask concerns how the perfor-
mer uses what was right about the mistake to “sum 
up and carry forward” and delivers a second excite-
ment: that the mistake did not linger. A few seconds 
after hearing the mistake, we could no longer tell 
whether we had heard a mistake. In the language of 
jazz theorists, the mistake was “saved” by subsequent 
notes (Berliner, 1994). The mistake was a mis-take. 
If a mis-take can be replayed into an erasure of itself 
as a mistake, storehouse theories of mastery can 
be replayed into descriptions of the delicate and 
mutually enhancing relations between skills and fast-
paced changing environments.
Jazz greats have strong advice along these lines. 
Saxophonist Don Byas reported pianist Art Tatum's 
opinion: “Just remember there is no such thing as 
a wrong note… What makes a note wrong is when 
you don't know where to go after that one. As long 
as you know how to get to the next note, there's no 
such thing as a wrong note. You hit any note you 
want and it its any chord” (in Taylor, 1993, p. 52).9 
A description of the notes making up, and taking up, 
the immediate context of Monk's apparent mistake 
conirms Tatum's wisdom. A mis-take is rarely a lone 
event. For a skilled player, it is a systematic develop-
ment of whence it came, and it can be saved, in turn, 
by how it connects to what follows.
We offer a formulation of plans, takes, and mis-
takes three times each: (a) as commonly theorized, 
(b) as talked about by experienced jazz musicians 
who know better, and (c) as each has emerged in 
our descriptive work. Figure 1 offers same reformu-
lations in summary form.
Plans (a). A plan is often understood as an execu-
tive function that, once in place, gets followed one 
step at a time. Miller, Galanter and Pribram deined a 
plan as “any hierarchical process in the organism that 
can control the order in which a sequence of opera-
tions is to be performed” (1960, p. 17). This posi-
tion assumes an environment that stands predictably 
still, enough for all eventualities to be anticipated, 
taken into account, and, upon relection, appropria-
ted. A student of planned activity, complains Lucy 
Suchman, “need only know the predisposition of the 
actor and the alternative courses that are available 
in order to predict the action's course. The action's 
course is just the playing out of these antecedent 
factors, knowable in advance of, and standing in 
a determinative relationship to, the action itself” 
(1987, p.  51). Such a view is inherently partial 
and incomplete; it leaves no room for the lively 
complexity of activities in time. Plans are an object 
of analysis only for activities that unfold by decision 
tree and do not require fast action in relexively shif-
ting environments. 
Plans (b). Jazz musicians must adjust to changing 
environments of their own making. They unders-
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tand, and often articulate, that plans are over-rated. 
It is not that they cannot, or do not, play pieces iden-
tically across years, but they often abandon plans 
for nuanced innovation; they tinker to make the 
song better, where “better” may mean either more 
musical or more responsive to and relective of the 
artists' mood at the moment of performance. For 
jazz musicians, a plan is less an exact calculus for 
what must happen next and more a description of 
expectations not exactly followed while making last 
gasp adjustments to new patterns cascading from a 
newly deinite past to an emergent future. Berliner 
(1994) reminds us that improvisation typically shifts 
between the performance of pre-composed ideas and 
those conceived in the moment of performance.
Plans (c). A plan can be redefined as always 
emergent and contingent, never exactly as stated, and 
sensitive not just to surrounding environments, but 
to the very environments of which it is partially consti-
tutive. Human engagements are organized this way. 
Suchman (1987) has offered a precise account:
“Plans are eficient formulations of situated actions… 
As efficient formulations, however, the significance 
of plans turns on their relation back to the unique 
circumstances and unarticulated practices of situated 
activities.” (1987, p. 186)
Takes (a). A take is understood as a dependent 
and unruly child of the plan. Dictates from the throne 
of competence are deiled by the realities of perfor-
mance always limited by messy particulars – inclu-
ding one's own or others' mistakes – of moment.
Takes (b). Jazz musicians have a thicker analy-
sis of a take. Information that guides performance 
can come from many places within a performance 
system. Along with a preset plan, performers get 
information most generally from “vibes and venue” 
Figure 1.
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(Berliner, 1994) and most particularly from what has 
just been played. Pianist Keith MacDonald stresses 
past, present, and future as the nexus where he plays 
music. “Everything is a reaction to what was just 
done. When I improvise, I think in phrases. If one 
of these phrases is interrupted, I abandon the past 
idea and develop a new one” (in conversation with 
Klemp, 2000). Berliner cites drummer Max Roach to 
point:
“From the irst note you hear, you are responding 
to what you've just played: you just said this on your 
instrument, and now that's a constant. What follows 
from that? And then the next phrase is a constant. What 
follows from that? And so on so forth. And inally, let's 
wrap it up so that everybody understands that that's 
what you're doing.” (1994, p. 192)
The last note played is not the only context for 
what can be done next, but it is crucial.
Takes (c). A take is the site of reality, where 
organism-environment relations are worked on and 
worked out, where possibilities of and constraints on 
what can be played next deine each other, where 
structure and emergence do battle. From the begin-
ning of a take, the physical acoustic past is set, and 
anything that follows must be integral to what has 
already happened, but its retrospective contextual 
interpretation is malleable. Anything that follows 
must “sum up” or face further revision. Pianist Randy 
Halberstadt says, “You've probably heard the axiom: 
there are no wrong notes in jazz. But the most rigo-
rous perspective is that there is only one right note: 
the one that I hear at that moment” (1994).
Mis-takes (a). The standard view is that a mistake 
is the same as an error, a break from plan due to a 
faulty head or hand. It is to be avoided, recontex-
tualized, hidden, or conceded with chagrin as an 
embarrassment.
Mis-takes (b). Jazz performers know better. 
Consider Don Byas:
“There is no such thing as hitting a wrong note. It's 
just that when you hit that wrong note, you've got to 
know how to make it right … you just keep weaving 
and there's no way in the world you can get lost. You 
hit one. It's not right, you hit another… As long as you 
keep going you're all right, but don't stop, because if 
you stop you are in trouble.” (in Taylor, 1993, p. 52).
Performers do not have time to explain what has 
just happened. Their work is to continue in real time 
– the pulse of the rhythm section creates demands 
for new input every second. Questions of “what and 
why” pale before questions of “whence and how.”
Mis-takes (c). A mis-take is a sensible move 
within a system of moves so tuned to circumstances 
it can be used to explore the “whence and how,” 
the constraints and possibilities, of what happened 
before articulated with what happens next. Anything 
spontaneous, says Dewey, even an errant note, is “the 
result of long periods of activity, or else it is so empty 
as not to be an act of expression” (1934/1980, p. 72). 
A wrong note is errant only to what has already 
happened, and it can be made less errant by rearran-
ging what happens next. A mis-take is in this way a 
spontaneous move in a system of moves in search of 
connections that carry forward.
Recasting terms in our title weakens the borders 
of their commonsense meanings and reverses the 
analytic igure/ground that puts plans and mistakes 
first and actual activities and their consequences 
second. When we listen to music, we hear neither 
plans, nor mistakes, but takes in which expecta-
tions and dificulties get worked on in the medium 
of notes, tones and rhythms. Notes live in connec-
tion with each other. They make demands on each 
other, and, if one note sticks out, the logic of their 
connections demands that they be reset and realig-
ned. Analyzing Monk from the perspective of the 
notes invites an account of the save.
A save, in the classical traditions, is generally 
understood as a cover-up, an effort to hide an 
embarrassment before others notice and remem-
ber. Jazz musicians think more productively. They 
do not let a mistake interfere with the production of 
music. The only mistake, warned Tatum, is to stop. 
A real mistake leaves a musician without knowing 
“where to go.” Pianist Herbie Hancock has reported 
a seeming mistake Miles Davis cleaned up for him, 
for them, for the audience:
“The music was building, the audience was right 
there with us, and at the peak of Miles' solo on ‘So 
What’ I played a really wrong chord. Miles took a breath 
and played a phrase that made my chord right. Miles 
didn't hear it as wrong, but instead as something that 
happened.” (in Eskow, 2002)
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By this account, Hancock's mistake was not a 
mistake for Miles Davis, but just “something that 
happened,” another in a continuous stream of musi-
cal events for the musician to react to and bring to 
order. A save rebuilds connections (across seconds 
of time and dozens of notes) in relation to both a 
further past and a not yet patterned sequence of 
notes. A save is a learning moment for artists who 
challenge themselves with problems.
A TAKE, A MIS-TAKE, AND A SAVE
Working with Monk brought me close to a 
musical architect of the highest order. I felt I 
learned from him in every way–through the 
senses, theoretically, technically. I would talk to 
Monk about musical problems, and he would 
sit at the piano and show me the answers just 
by playing them. 
John Coltrane (1960)
Along with Charlie Parker and Dizzy Gillespie, 
Monk was in New York for the start of bebop – a 
1940’s jazz movement marked by great experimenta-
tion, both tonal and rhythmic: tonal, “less symmetri-
cal, more chromatic (that is, drew on all twelve notes 
of the octave)” (Szwed, 2001, p. 164); and rhythmic, 
seemingly “erratic” with “staggered, unusual use of 
silences… along with offbeat accents and sudden 
shifts in speed” (pp. 165-166). Monk pushed bebop 
perhaps further than anyone. Consider John Szwed's 
description of Monk in 1948 playing behind vibra-
phone master Milt Jackson's bluesy lead on the song 
“Misterioso” (not the album by the same title):
“A repeated interval of a seventh… breaks up the low 
of Jackson's solo, or restructures it, depending on how 
you hear it. Monk's solo on the other hand is shocking 
in its resistance to the logic of conventional views. 
Phrases seem to end on the wrong note, the intervals 
he chooses sound wrong, he seems to fall behind at 
one point, and he repeatedly sounds crashing seconds. 
Then a return to the melody, this time with only Jackson 
playing it, while Monk drops unpredictable single notes 
all over the keyboard, scattering the melody, turning a 
realistic painting into a pointalistic shocker…” (p. 174)
Monk’s style influenced most pianists who 
followed. His compositions, “Straight No Chaser,” 
“Round Midnight,” and “Well You Needn’t,” have 
become standards of the jazz canon. Monk brought 
adventure to any constant rhythmic or harmo-
nic base: “instead of peacefully stating a key and a 
tempo, Monk sticks absolutely ambiguous chords in 
the most incomprehensible places” (De Wolfe, 1996, 
p. 61).
“In Walked Bud” was composed by Monk in 1947 
as a new melody over the harmony of the hit tune, 
“Blue Skies” (Gourse, 1997, p. 29). Using a tradi-
tional jazz quartet configuration, Monk's recor-
dings begin and end with a melody surrounding a 
middle of improvised saxophone, piano, bass, and 
drum solos. Monk's melody weaves choppy, almost 
harsh rhythmic textures together with rich melodic 
lines. The group plays the melody irst, and then uses 
the chords as a framework for creating improvised 
rhythmic and melodic themes before returning to the 
melody at the end. The melody section (what jazz 
musicians call “the head”) is 32 bars long and can 
be divided into four eight bar sections. “In Walked 
Bud” follows the standard jazz AABA form with four 
sections. The A section is played twice, then B (often 
called the “bridge”), and then A once more. This 
AABA structure remains a consistent chordal and 
harmonic structure over which the group improvises 
throughout all three recordings we analyzed. As is 
standard jazz practice, each performance begins and 
ends with a statement of the head.
We examined Monk's solo for evidence that he 
might be attempting to “save” a mis-take. In jazz, as 
in conversation, there is no exact calculus for what 
happens next – only well organized constraints 
and possibilities negotiated by participants in situ. 
Wanting to know what Monk was attempting to do 
is a endless problem for analysts, listeners, and parti-
cipants alike. Monk himself probably could not be 
certain. We cannot solve this problem, but we can 
circumscribe it, literally, to write around it. Posterity 
has left us with three live recordings of Monk's solo 
on “In Walked Bud,” from the albums Live at the 
Five Spot (1957), San Francisco Holiday (1959), and 
Misterioso (1958). Within these versions, we have 
a Rosetta Stone of performed jazz. They reveal less 
what Monk had in mind than the “whence and how” 
of his ingers in systematically various contexts. On 
each recording, he elaborates and reshapes part of his 
improvised solo in nearly identical ways. The identi-
cal shows how much structure and well-rehearsed 
constraint move with Monk from one performance 
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to the next, and the nearly shows how much each 
performance is contingent and emergent.
The solo fragment consists of a series of licks (jazz 
parlance for a short phrase or motif) played over the 
irst two A sections of the song (the irst 16 bars). It 
is based on a series of repeated triplet igures termi-
nating each time by referring to a note from the 
head. In all three performances, the fragment lasts 
through the irst two A sections (see Figure 2). In the 
B section, the improvisations diverge from the initial 
pattern, recapitulating during the inal A section.
Finding common motifs across solos enables us 
to establish an outline of what linguists call marked 
and unmarked pairs. Unmarked pairings are unre-
markable, as expected, uneventful, without modii-
cation, and marked pairings are different, in need of 
comment, and modiied. The irst and second recor-
dings (1957, 1959) are unmarked and offer a patter-
ned contrast set for the analysis of the third recording 
(1958). The third recording carries the apparent 
mistake – likely it was a surprise to listeners, and 
perhaps to Monk – but what makes it marked are the 
notes that follow the mistake and make it a mis-take. 
Together, the three versions of the theme, and the 
responses to how they were played, provide an analy-
tic baseline, if not for identifying wrong notes, then at 
least for highlighting the conditions for their occur-
rence and, more importantly, their transformation.
The irst and second lines of Figure 3 offer trans-
criptions of the unmarked performances (begin-
ning at 7:32 on Live at the Five Spot and 4:41 on San 
Francisco Holiday). The theme lasts for approximately 
18 seconds. The transcripts cover the 16 measures of 
the irst two A sections, each containing four itera-
tions of a lick. In the transcript, each lick is numbe-
red (L1 to L8).
Figure 3 shows that the licks on the unmarked 
recordings (1957, 1959) begin and conclude at the 
same time. These recordings add context to the third 
performance (1958) with the marked note – the mis-
take – and its emergence and repair. The second and 
marked theme is made more complex when Monk 
strikes the mis-take that falls outside the pattern of 
the unmarked theme during the sixth lick (Figure 3, 
measure 11). The errant note makes the 1958 recor-
ding less identical to the other two; the nearly in the 
nearly identical threatens to run amok. Monk uses 
the tension and dissonance of the mis-take to develop 
what follows: he “saves” the mis-take by introducing 
half-step dissonance (minor seconds chords consis-
ting of two notes played a half-step apart) that alter 
the rhythm of the pattern and echo the dissonance 
that looms from Monk’s original mis-take. The use 
of half-step dissonance plays a dominant role from 
lick six through the end of the solo. Monk is known 
for his use of minor seconds, perhaps in an effort to 
emancipate himself from the rigid pitch class choices 
imposed by a fixed-pitch instrument, such as the 
piano, and in an attempt to emulate the continuous 
pitch choices available on wind instruments such as 
the saxophone and the human voice. We offer now a 
more systematic account of the structure of both the 
unmarked and unmarked themes.
The unmarked theme: The most apparent simi-
larity in the two performances is the symmetry of 
rhythmic couplets. In both takes, the starting point 
of each lick is identical. L1, L3, L5, and L7 start on 
the irst beat of the irst bar, and are coupled with L2, 
L4, and L6, respectively, which begin on the third 
beat of the following bar. Each couplet is followed 
by a bar of rest, as the drums and bass mark time 
(measure four, eight, twelve, and sixteen). One 
exception, where the lick is displaced slightly in time 
and the notes changed can be seen in L8.
Along with rhythmic symmetry, the unmarked 
themes share tonal and melodic qualities. Some licks 
Figure 2. Diagram of each recording. H indicates the head (melody), each box represents one cycle of the AABA structure, and 
X marks the solos that are transcribed in Figure 2.
PLANS, TAKES, AND MIS-TAKES 
Nathaniel Klemp, Ray McDermott, Jason Duque, Matthew Thibeault, Kimberly Powell & Daniel J. Levitin
113
employ slightly different rhythms, but all begin with 
a short triplet igure. At L1 Monk plays a descending 
three-note pattern twice. Each of these patterns is 
composed of the same three notes (A-lat, G, and F). 
While these triplet patterns are not always played in 
exactly the same way, the irst two beats of Monk's 
licks never stray from these three notes.
Figure 3.
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The marked or more complex theme: Figure 3 
also offers a transcription of the marked performance 
from 1958. Similar to the other two in its basic melo-
dic and rhythmic structure, the most apparent diffe-
rence is the divergent note in L6 (on the Misterioso 
recording, the transcription begins at 6:53, and the 
mis-take happens at 7:04). The triplet igure is shif-
ted up a whole-step on the keyboard. Instead of 
playing A-lat at the start of the triplet, Monk plays a 
B-lat. It breaks the triplet pattern found throughout 
all the themes, and the intriguing changes that both 
precede and follow the irregular note make it worthy 
of analysis.
We begin with what precedes the mis-take in 
Figure 3. Monk's mis-take begins long before the 
offending note, just as it ends long after it. L1 begins 
on the irst beat of the A section, exactly the same 
point as before. After that, a difference emerges. L2 is 
played two beats later than before. That is, Monk 
waits two beats and shifts the start of L2 to the third 
bar. The changes further diverge from the unmarked 
themes at the end of L2. Instead of playing a single 
descending eighth note igure at the end of the lick, 
he prolongs the ending of L2 by repeating himself 
(twice, using different notes). With the delay in L2, 
he starts L4 before it begins in the two unmarked 
themes. Instead of playing L3, as per the unmarked 
themes, he plays L4 earlier. The irst A section closes 
earlier, with the consequence that there are two addi-
tional beats of silence in the piano part before L5 
(measures 7 and 8). The rhythmic irregularities alter 
the structure of the solo and the starting point of 
each lick, and results in a three lick irst A section 
– a clear departure from the four-lick A section of the 
unmarked theme.
The second phrase returns to the structure of 
the unmarked themes. Monk begins L5 on the irst 
beat of the measure. At the end of the lick, where the 
eighth note interval is played, he introduces a half-
step dissonance (when two notes a half step apart 
are played together). Just before he plays the second 
to the last note of L5 (see boxed note following L5), 
he strikes the note a half-step below to create a more 
dissonant sound (this is often called a ‘grace note’ or 
‘blue note’). This sets up L6 in which the mis-take 
occurs. During the second descending triplet of L6, 
Monk strikes a jarring note a whole-step above all 
other notes in the pattern. In all variations, the irst 
two beats of Monk’s lick are limited to three notes 
(A-lat, G, and F). In L6 of the marked theme, Monk 
moves up a whole-step to begin the second descen-
ding triplet on a B-lat, a note he does not play in 
other iterations. For the irst time listener, a whole 
step jump is a shocking deviation. Not only does the 
mis-take break the pattern set by previous iterations, 
it is made more prominent by the sharp accent.
Following the mis-take, Monk plays another half-
step chord to recreate the dissonance and then an 
even more extreme dissonant half-step chord in the 
second to last note of L6 (see second boxed note 
in L6). Instead of playing a half-step chord as just 
prior to and following the mis-take, Monk plays a 
minor second chord, which consists of the melody 
note and the note a half-step below. By playing the 
two notes as a chord, Monk creates an even stronger 
dissonance.
Following L6, Monk continues to develop and 
expand the half-step dissonance. In L7, he strikes 
two more grace notes located a half step below the 
note in the pattern (see the two boxed notes in L7). 
Finally, in L8, Monk substitutes dissonant half-step 
chords for the descending triplet lines he normally 
plays. Instead of playing the three notes separately, 
he clumps the irst two notes together into a disso-
nant chord and then plays the third note alone. He 
returns to the dissonant sound in the third beat of the 
lick (see the third boxed note at L8) by repeating the 
half-step chord one last time and then completes L8 
as in the two unmarked themes. The general pattern 
that emerges after the mistake creates a new envi-
ronment enabling the hearer to locate the mistake as 
the beginning of a larger pattern that fuses the disso-
nance of the mistake with the existing melody. Monk 
creates a coordination of parts and a whole in which 
a future following a mistake has the opportunity to 
reshape the past preceding the mistake.
Following his mis-take, Monk does not continue 
the pattern set by the unmarked theme. The jarring 
dissonance of the mis-take seems to reconstruct his 
improvisational plan; it prompts him to change the 
normal pattern by developing new melodic ideas. 
The mis-take becomes not so much a momentary 
interruption of his improvisational imagination as 
an occasion for a new take, a reconceptualization of 
where he is going melodically and harmonically, one 
that swallows the mis-take by developing the harsh 
dissonance of the wrong note. In L7 and L8, Monk 
increases the amount of tension and dissonance and 
transforms the mis-take into a seemingly intentional 
aspect of the dissonant pattern.
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THE  SEQUENTIAL  ORGANIZATION  OF 
ACTIVITIES
[The] vital part is thinking while you're 
moving, and once the momentum has been 
started, 
I don't like to break it. I'm concerned with the 
continuity in motion… 
If you're not affected and inluenced by your 
own notes when you improvise, 
then you're missing the whole essential point. 
Saxophonist Lee Konitz (in Berliner, 1994, 
p. 193)
Timing is a primary consideration in all human 
activities, but lived time, time as it is handled by 
people in their dealings with each other and the 
world, is not central enough to mainstream social 
and behavioral science inquiries (McDermott & 
Raley, 2011). Dewey's metaphysics of transiency 
offers a definition of time operated on and expe-
rienced by people living lives: “the organized and 
organizing medium of the rhythmic ebb and low 
of expectant impulse, forward and retracted move-
ment, resistance and suspense, with fulillment and 
consummation” (1934/1980, p. 23). By contrast, in 
the social sciences, time is simple duration; it marks 
off intervals before and after a particular event. By a 
methodologically mandated metaphysics of assumed 
stability, entities are frozen in time; they are what 
they are, they occur when they occur, and then they 
are correlated, networked, shown to be caused, and 
even explained. Their play in time – not just when 
they might happen, but by the play of what “expec-
tant impulse… [and] suspense” they happen – is 
rarely described or theorized.10
In this paper, we have analyzed a single piano 
note – a seeming entity – and shown how its quality 
is sequentially dependent moment to moment on its 
“whence and how.” The note comes from a speci-
ic whence and builds to a speciic whither, and the 
summing up and carrying forward – the sumhow – 
gets done with dazzling speed. A single note cannot 
make a song. A single muscle cannot make a moving 
inger. All movement and performance demand coor-
dination of a past and future with the circumstances 
of moment. Sumhow is the primal take of engagement 
with the world.
The terms organism and environment do not 
gloss separate realities only occasionally brought 
into interaction in varying proportions. For Dewey, 
they relentlessly conduct behavior with each other. 
Mutual adjustment and learning are constant and 
necessary. Stimulus and response live in ongoing 
entanglements that render a stimulus only in anti-
cipation of a response and a response only in antici-
pation of a next stimulus. The insight came early to 
Dewey, but when he wrote the following key text,11 
he could have been writing for Monk playing decades 
later:
“The distinction of sensation and movement as 
stimulus and response respectively is not a distinction 
which can be regarded as descriptive of anything which 
holds of psychical events or existences as such. The 
relex arc theory… gives us literally an arc, instead of 
a circuit; and not giving us the circuit of which it is an 
arc, does not enable us to place, to centre, the arc. This 
arc, again, falls apart into two separate existences having 
to be either mechanically or externally adjusted to each 
other.” (1896/1981, p. 147)
With a change of only a few words, we can 
inscribe Dewey's words on Monk's mis-take:
“The distinction of planning and playing as stimulus 
and response respectively is not a distinction which 
can be regarded as descriptive of anything which 
holds of psychical events or existences as such. A 
cognitive learning theory… gives us literally a plan and 
performance errors, instead of a circuit and its mis-takes 
and repairs; and not giving us the circuit of which it is 
a momentary plan, does not enable us to coordinate, to 
time, the relations among the notes. This planning and 
playing, again, falls apart into two separate existences 
having to be either mechanically or externally adjusted 
to each other.” (1896/1981, p. 147; alterations in italics)
By shifting the focus from plans and mistakes to 
takes, mis-takes, and saves, we can describe musi-
cal activities as participants recognize, identify, and 
use them to organize themselves. This signiicant 
difference stresses the organism in action without 
a resting place between stimulus and response. Past 
and future push and pull on each other – Dewey's 
“forward and retracted movement” – without relief. 
This is as true of talk as music. In conversation analy-
sis, turns at talk are shown to be “recipient desig-
ned,” “mutually constituted,” and held together by 
self and other repair (Sacks, 1990; Schegloff, 1992, 
1996). There is no immaculate conception avai-
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lable to speakers, no immaculate reception available 
to listeners. Planning to do anything in particular 
– in conversation or in a jazz solo – brings risk and 
requires relentless attention to repair. Cast a suspi-
cious eye on plans and mistakes as autonomous 
phenomena. They occur, but only in time, in rela-
tion to visible and hearable other events, relexively 
tied to what has happened, what is happening, and 
what is about to happen.
If coordination with emerging environments 
partially of our own making is the primal task, and 
if precariousness is a constant opportunity, what 
might learning and education be? Novelist (and 
trumpeter), Ralph Ellison, insists that “dance halls 
and jam sessions along with recordings are the true 
academy for jazz” and that teaching it “formally 
might well have imposed stability upon a develo-
ping form” (2001, p. 23).12 Most learning happens 
outside school. Languages acquire their native spea-
kers without school, technological revolutions 
acquire their engineers by an invisible extracurri-
cular hand, and most art forms take root in cracks 
between formal institutions. Schools are organized to 
miss the edgy, the up for grabs, the what's happening 
now, and the what might happen tomorrow. To the 
extent that schools document the very mistakes they 
repress and subsequently use them to sort students 
institutionally, the very place that promises learning 
instead produces also constant and often debilitating 
failure (see Varenne & McDermott, 1998).
For Dewey, and for the jazz community, lear-
ning is ubiquitous and continuous. This would be 
a non-controversial position if learning were not 
taken, and mistaken, to be a thing – an entity, and a 
measurable one – rather than something people must 
do constantly in the course of getting their lives to 
“sum up and carry forward.” Progressive thinking 
– whether in education or jazz – relies on accounts of 
learning as a point of reorganization in the real-time 
pull and push of past and future (McDermott, 2015). 
Learning is best understood as more in the moment 
than in a stockpile of competencies. Learning is less a 
state of mastery than a constant process of disruption 
and renovation, the momentary product, as Dewey 
said, of “the exercise of powers needed to meet the 
demands of the activity in operation,” operation after 
operation (1937/1991, p. 238).13
Isolated and recorded mistakes rarely lead to 
“relationships that sum up and carry forward.” They 
rarely reshape the flow of activities. In schools, 
students are too often tracked and diagnosed and 
spend their days arranging not getting caught not 
knowing something.
More than a century ago, Dewey added timing 
and reflexivity – what he called circuitry – to the 
analytically limiting divide between stimulus and 
response.14 We rewrote his argument to critique 
the division between planning and playing and can 
rewrite the same text to critique the duality of lear-
ning and doing:
“The distinction of learning and doing as stimulus 
and response respectively is not a distinction which 
can be regarded as descriptive of anything which holds 
of psychical events or existences as such. A cognitive 
theory… gives us literally a learner, instead of a circuit 
of engagements in real time; and not giving us the circuit 
of which it is a learner, does not enable us to situate, to 
nurture, the learner. This learner, again, falls apart into 
two separate existences having to be either mechanically 
or externally adjusted to each other.” (1896/1981, 
p. 147; alterations in italics)
Children and teachers sometimes know better 
than to separate learning from doing, but rarely have 
means to alter their situation, the very situation we 
have helped to create with static ideas about plans 
and mistakes. Jazz musicians know better than to 
separate learning from doing, and for a few moments 
in 1958, Monk did some things that organized an 
environment – a circuit of engagements – in which 
learning could happen: nothing for sure, but possibly 
learning for Monk, or his musicians, or their liste-
ners decades later. We need to discover and cele-
brate more such engagements, and we can use jazz 
to rework analytic instincts around sequence and 
learning. Dewey's project was to complicate the divi-
sions between stimulus and response, between plan 
and play, between doing and learning, and it is fun to 
think that, in a verbally vague and musically precise 
way, it was Monk's project as well.
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NOTES
1. Prepared for Éducation & Didactique based on an origi-
nal publication in Outlines: Critical Practical Studies, 2008, 
10(1), 4-21.
2. Dewey’s “sum up and carry forward” appears hereafter 
with quotation marks, but without citation.
3. From phenomenology and pragmatism, consider just 
four. William James (1904): “... experience as a whole is 
a process in time, whereby innumerable particular terms 
lapse and are superseded by others that follow upon them 
by transitions which, whether disjunctive or conjunc-
tive in content, are themselves experiences, and must in 
general be accounted at least as real as the terms which 
they relate… In such a world, transition and arrivals (or 
terminations) are the only events that happen, tho they 
happen by so many sorts of path” (1976, pp. 31-32); Henri 
Bergson (1911): “Action is discontinuous, like every pulsa-
tion of life; discontinuous, therefore, is knowledge” (1969, 
p. 307); Edmund Husserl: “... even in the content of that 
which is perceptually given as itself, there is, on closer 
inspection, an element of anticipation. In fact, nothing in 
perception is purely and adequately perceived” (quoted in 
Zahavi, 2003, p. 96); George Herbert Mead (1932): “If we 
could bring back the present that has elapsed in the reality 
which belonged to it, it would not serve us. It would be 
that present and would lack just that character which we 
demand in the past, that is, the construction of the condi-
tioning nature of now present passage which enables us to 
interpret what is arising in the future that belongs to this 
present. A strings of presents conceivably existing as pres-
ents would never constitute a past.” (p. 30).
4. Attention to Dewey’s sensitivity to timing in human 
activities should not hide a sophisticated literature 
combining linguistic and phenomenological analyses of 
music, talk, and body movement in various combinations 
(Schutz, 1953; Sudnow, 1978; Byers, 1985; Attali, 1987; 
Kendon, 1990; McNeill, 1992, 2007; Feld & Fox, 1994; 
Lindsay, 1996; Monson, 1996; Sawyer, 2000; Erickson, 
2004; Levitin, 2006; Solis, 2008; Cappelletti, 2010). See 
the rich descriptions of “sequential relevance” in conver-
sation analysis (Sacks, 1990), particularly on error repair 
(Schegloff 1992). Dewey and G. H. Mead (1932) have an 
added attraction: that they make time and creativity central 
to any organization of activities while they simultaneously 
articulate theories of learning, education, and democracy 
(e.g., Bredo, 1994, 1997; Joas, 1996; Manicas, 1998, 2002; 
J. McDermott, 1981, 2007).
5. That Monk actually said this is not clear. That he said 
things like it are better documented. That he should have 
said it is convincingly argued by Feurzing (2011).
6. Dewey’s “whence and how” (1934/1980, p. 135) is a 
workman’s take on William James’s more poetic “whence 
and whither” as in: “An activity-series is deined by its 
whence and whither” (James 1905/1976, p. 257). “Whence 
and how” appears hereafter with quotation marks, but 
without citation.
7. Music cognition theorists have similarly argued that 
music listening requires memory of the actual notes that 
have come before (absolute values) as well as their roles 
and functions in the ongoing development of musical 
harmony and changing tonal centers (Narmour, 1990). It 
is a normal part of composition that new notes retrospecti-
vely inluence an understanding of those that came before 
(Levitin, 2006). In jazz improvisation, the performer is the 
composer, and recontextualization can either be planned 
or executed in a post-hoc or ad hoc basis. From an ethno-
methodological tradition, consider David Sudnow: “Having 
a visual-conceptual means for going places, incorporated 
into a tactilely managed set of easeful maneuvers and the 
development of varieties of dexterities in engagement with 
the terrain, there was enough ‘jazziness’ to my actions that 
I felt at the piano I was essentially doing what jazz players 
do” (1978, p. 34; see Bowman & Powell, 2007; Cappelletti, 
2008).
8. The words “apparent” and “seeming” do not modify the 
notes as much as they refer to the likely uncertainty of 
Monk as he played and the resultant uncertainty of our 
analysis. We are less interested in establishing just what a 
mistake is than we are in raising the question of whether a 
mistake is a useful category to begin an analysis.
9. Lester (1994) claims Tatum rarely made mistakes. If he 
did, he “saved” them faster than people could hear.
10. Fifty years ago, paying analytic attention to time distin-
guished ethnomethodology from mainstream sociology 
and generative grammar (items in process) from stochas-
tic linguistics (items in arrangement), but most schools of 
social research have proceeded as if things could be studied 
out of time: in isolation or in simple combination.
11. We borrow and manipulate a text from “The relex 
arc concept in psychology” (Dewey, 1896/1981). Perhaps 
Dewey’s most popular essay, it had great impact on psycho-
logy and philosophy early in the century and again at the 
start of the cognitive revolution in the l950s (see Miller, 
Galanter & Pribram, 1960). The text could appear in any 
Dewey book. He would often introduce the strengths and 
weakness of both sides of a sensible, but misleading dicho-
tomy (like stimulus and response), then critique their easy 
opposition and the world that drives them asunder, and end 
by proposing a way to move beyond, to appreciate the more 
inclusive circuit of which the two sides are a part. Theory/
practice, nature/culture, individual/social, and ideal/real 
take a beating in most of his writings, but he tackles new 
dualisms for each problem addressed; see Democracy and 
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Education (1916a) for 38 troublesome pairings and, for a 
commentary, Elizabeth Flower’s “Dewey: Battling against 
Dualisms” (in Flower and Murphey, 1977). Substituting 
vocabulary from other realms of activity into our borrowed 
text allows us to approximate Dewey’s view on still more 
dichotomies.
12.  On jazz  as  a  teaching/ learning  commu-
nity, see Berliner (1994, especially Chapters  2-3). 
Cornell West (2004) sums up and carries on: 
“…all foundational figures of the blues and jazz heri-
tage… created and enacted a profound democra-
tic paideia – a cultivation of critical citizenry – in the 
midst of the darkness of America. If the blues is the 
struggle against pain for transcendence, then, as Duke 
Ellington proclaimed, ‘jazz is freedom’.” (pp.  91-92) 
On appreciating the complex place of music in a distant 
community, see McPhee (1954) and Ebron’s (2002) care-
ful exposition.
13. Dewey complained that for Aristotle, and for contem-
porary school based theories, “learning meant growth of 
knowledge, and growth belongs in the region of becoming, 
change, and hence is inferior to possession of knowledge” 
(1920, p. 31; italics in the original). For Dewey, learning 
also means growth in the context of becoming and change, 
but this is in no way makes learning an inferior state.
14. In this way, he presaged the work of the neuroscientists 
Karl Lashley (1951) and Lashley’s student Donald Hebb 
(1949), whose pioneering advances related to the organi-
zation of time in neural networks; see also Miller, Galanter, 
and Pribram (1960).
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